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Abstract
We study estimation and non-parametric identification of preferences in two-sided
matching markets using data from a single market with many agents. We consider
a model in which preferences of each side of the market are vertical, utility is non-
transferable and the observed matches are pairwise stable. We show that preferences
are not identified with data on one-to-one matches but are non-parametrically iden-
tified when data from many-to-one matches are observed. The additional empirical
content in many-to-one matches is illustrated by comparing two simulated objective
functions, one that does and the other that does not use information available in many-
to-one matching. We also prove consistency of a method of moments estimator for a
parametric model under a data generating process in which the size of the matching
market increases, but data only on one market is observed. Since matches in a single
market are interdependent, our proof of consistency cannot rely on observations of
independent matches. Finally, we present Monte Carlo studies of a simulation based
estimator.
∗We thank Susan Athey, Gary Chamberlain, Victor Chernozhukov, Raj Chetty, Kirill Evdokimov, Jeremy
Fox, Phil Haile, Whitney Newey, Ariel Pakes and Parag Pathak for helpful discussions. Agarwal: Cowles
Foundation, Yale University and Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, email:
agarwaln@mit.edu. Diamond: Department of Economics, Harvard University, email: wdiamond@hbs.edu.
1 Introduction
There has been growing interest in estimating preferences of agents in two-sided matching
markets.1 Since preferences determine outcomes in these markets, estimation these primitives
is an important step for quantitatively evaluating economic questions such as counterfactual
analysis of equilibrium effects of policy interventions or market structure. However, a re-
searcher often has access only to data on final matches instead of stated preferences. In these
cases, one approach is to use an equilibrium assumption on the observed matches to infer
preferences of agents in the market as a function of agents characteristics, some of which
may not be observed.
We consider estimation and non-parametric identification of preferences using a model in
which utility is not transferable and the observed match is assumed to be pairwise stable. A
non-transferable utility (NTU) model is an attractive assumption for markets where transfers
are not individually negotiated or are prohibited. Examples include the matching of students
to public schools or universities with free tuition or exogenous financial aid criteria; labor
or apprenticeship markets with inflexible wages such as the medical residency market or a
public-sector labor market with pre-determined wage scales. In these settings, preferences
of agents on both sides of the market determine equilibrium outcomes: a student cannot
simply show up to class in a college since she first needs to be admitted, and conversely,
colleges compete to enroll the best students. Further, non-transferable utility may be a good
assumption if financial aid is based on student characteristics and income criteria that are
exogenous to the other colleges that admit that student.
Separately estimating preferences of agents on both sides of the market may be neces-
sary for understanding the determinants of observed outcomes, and for analyzing certain
economic questions. For instance, quanititatively evaluating the trade-off for firms between
experience and education of the worker, the trade-off for workers between wages and the
value of ammenities such as on-the-job training, or the welfare effects of alternative market
1See Fox (2009) for a survey.
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structures can require separate preference estimates of agents on both sides of the market.
Identifying preferences of agents on both sides of the market may be a challenging exercise
because equilibrium matches are jointly determined by both sets of preferences: when we see
a student enrolling at a particular college, it need not be the case that the college is her most
preferred option because she may have not been accepted at her more preferred institutions.
We analyze the estimation and identification problem in a data environment in which
a researcher observes matches in a single large market. This modelling choice is made
for several reasons. First, data from several matching markets with the same underlying
structure are rare compared to data from a few markets with many agents. For example,
public high school markets, colleges, the medical residency market and marriage markets have
several thousand participating agents. Second, recent papers in the theoretical matching
literature have utilized large market approximations for analyzing strategic behaviour and
the structure of equilibria.2 Third, it highlights important interdependence between matches
within a market in the asymptotic analysis of our estimator.
The main restriction in our model is that preferences on each side of the market are
vertical, i.e., all agents agree on the relative ranking of any two agents. However, we allow for
agents to have unobservable characteristics that may affect their desirability to the other side
of the market. Therefore, two observationally identical agents need not be equally desirable.
The model may provide an appropriate approximation for studying a labor market in which
workers that have approximately homogeneous tastes for job-ammenities and firms value
components of worker skill similarly. While the restriction that agents have homogeneous
tastes is strong, the assumption is made for tractability given the well-known diffi culty of
expressing pairwise stable matches as a function of the preferences in a more general model.
The assumption makes the model tractable because it implies that pairwise stable matches
are perfectly assortative on the underlying desirabilities of the agents irrespective of their
distributions. This simplification allows us to obtain identification results without making
2See Immorlica and Mahdian (2005); Kojima and Pathak (2009); Azevedo and Budish (2012), for example.
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strong parametric assumptions on the latent utilities that represent the preferences of agents.
Even with this stark restriction on preferences, our first result on identification is negative.
We show that the distribution of preferences on both sides of the market are not identified
for a large class of models when only data from one-to-one matches are observed. Further,
we compute an example using a family of parametric models of one-to-one matching that
are observationally equivalent. The example highlights that our non-identification result is
not a result of excessively weak conditions on the model. Intuitively, the non-identification
arises because unobservable characteristics of either side of the market could be driving
the observed joint distribution of agents and their match partners. These results imply
limitations on what can be learned with data using data on one-to-one matches, and guide
the use of empirical techniques. For instance, they weigh against estimating non-transferable
utility models in marriage markets with data from a single market.
In contrast, we show that the distribution of preferences of agents on both sides of
the market is non-parametrically identified from data on many-to-one matches. The result
requires that each agent on one-side of the market is matched to at least two agents on the
other side, a requirement that is likely satisfied in many education and labor markets. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first positive result on non-parametric identification
of preferences of agents on both sides of the market in a non-transferable utility setting.
Particularly, the difference between the empirical content of one-to-one matching and many-
to-one matching has not been previously exploited to obtain identification results in our
setting. Our proof is based on interpreting the matching model with two-to-one matches in
terms of a measurement error model. This reinterpretation makes the additional empirical
content of many-to-one matches is ex-post intuitive: the observable components of quality
of a worker can provide a noisy measure of the overall quality of her colleagues.
We also illustrate the additional identifying information available in many-to-one matches
using simulations and a parametrized family of models. Our simulations suggest that mo-
ments that only use information available in sorting patterns are not able to distinguish
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between a large set of parameter values. In the context of one-to-one matching, this is the
only information observed in the dataset. In contrast, simulations also suggest that addi-
tional moments constructed from many-to-one matching can be used to distinguish parame-
ter values that yield indistinguishable sorting patterns. An objective function constructed
from both sets of moments has a global minimum near the true parameter. We therefore
recommend using information from many-to-one matching, when available.
We then study asymptotic properties of a method of moments estimator for a parametric
model based on a criterion function that uses moments from many-to-one matching as well
as sorting patterns. The main limit theorem proves that under identifiable uniqueness of
a parametric model, data on a single large market with many-to-one matches can be used
to consistently estimate the true parameter. For simplicity, we restrict to the case with
two-to-one matching. Our proof directly uses the properties of the equilibrium matches in
which we account for interdependence between observations. Finally, we use Monte Carlo
simulations to study the property of a simulation based estimator.
Related Literature: Most of the recent literature on identification and estimation
of matching games studies the transferable utility (TU) model in which the equilibrium
describes matches as well as the surplus split between the agents with quasi-linear preferences
for money (Choo and Siow, 2006; Sorensen, 2007; Fox, 2010a; Gordon and Knight, 2009;
Galichon and Salanie, 2010; Chiappori et al., 2011, among others). The equilibrium transfers
imply that no two unmatched agents can find a profitable transfer in which they would
like to match with each other. The typical goal in these studies is to recover a single
aggregate surplus which determines the equilibrium matches. Often, these studies face a
data constraint that monetary transfers between matched partners are not observed, so the
hope of estimating two separate utility functions is limited. A branch of this literature,
following the work of Choo and Siow (2006) proposes identification and estimation of a
transferable utility model based on the assumption that individuals have unobserved tastes
for observed groups of individuals. Agents in these models are indifferent between match
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partners of the same observable type, implying that the econometrician observes all agent
characteristics that are valued by the other side of the market. Using this assumption, the
papers propose estimation and identification of group-specific surplus functions (Choo and
Siow, 2006; Galichon and Salanie, 2010; Chiappori et al., 2011). In our model, agents have
homogeneous tastes for match partners, but agents are not indifferent between two partners
with identical observables because of unobserved characteristics. A different approach to
identification in transferable utility models, due to Fox (2010a), is based on assuming that
the structural unobservables are such that the probability of observing a particular match is
higher if the total systematic, observable component of utility is larger than an alternative
match. In non-transferable utility models, such as ours, this approach is diffi cult to motivate
since pairwise stable matchings need not maximize total surplus.
In many applications, inflexible monetary transfers or counterfactual analysis that re-
quire estimates of preferences for agents on both sides of the market motivate the use of
a non-transferable utility model. A large theoretical literature (c.f. Roth and Sotomayor,
1992) has been devoted to the study of properties of stable matchings in NTU models. To
our knowledge, however, there are only two previous papers that have formally considered
identification and estimation in this setting. Both papers are complementary to our analysis
and show partial identification of preferences. Hsieh (2011) follows Choo and Siow (2006)
in assuming that agents belong to finitely many observed groups and that agents have idio-
syncratic tastes for these groups. The main identification result in Hsieh (2011) shows that
the model can rationalize any distribution of matchings in this setting, implying that the
identified set is non-empty. Menzel (2013) studies identification and estimation in a non-
transferable utility model in a large market where agent preferences are heterogeneous due
to idiosyncratic match-specific tastes with a distribution in the domain of attraction of the
Generalized Extreme Value (GEV) family, and observable characteristics have bounded sup-
port. By using the tail properties of the GEV class, Menzel (2013) finds that only the sum
of the surplus of both sides obtained from matching is idenfied from data on one-to-one
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matching. The result is similar in spirit to our negative result on identification with one-to-
one matches. While these papers focus on the one-to-one matching case, our results exploit
data on many-to-one matches to non-parametrically identify preferences of both sides of the
market, although at the cost of assuming homogeneous preferences.
There are now a few papers that have estimated non-transferable utility models. Agarwal
(2013) estimates preferences in the market for medical residents using a method of simulated
moments estimator based on moments that exploit information in many-to-one matching in
addition to the sorting of resident and program characteristics. Logan et al. (2008) proposes
a Bayesian technique for estimating the posterior distribution of preference parameters in
marriage markets, and Boyd et al. (2013) estimates the preferences of teachers for schools
and schools for teachers using a method of moments estimator. Both Logan et al. (2008)
and Boyd et al. (2013) use only the sorting of observed characteristics of agents as given by
the matches (sorting patterns) to recover primitives. Our result on non-identification with
one-to-one matching implies that point estimates obtained with these approaches may be
sensitive to parametric assumptions.
A few empirical papers estimate sets of preference parameters that are consistent with
pairwise stability (Menzel, 2011; Uetake and Watanabe, 2012). The concern that preferences
need not be point identified with one-to-one matches does not necessarily apply to these
approaches. For example, Menzel (2011) uses two-sided matching to illustrate a Bayesian
approach for estimating a set of parameters consistent with an incomplete structural model.
Our results on non-identification and subsequent simulations that use information on sorting
patterns suggest that a rather large set of parameters are observationally equivalent. While
these results imply that the identified set may be large, these approaches may still be quite
informative for certain questions of interest.
Our finding that data from many-to-one matching is important in identification is related
to work by Fox (2010a) and Fox (2010b) on many-to-many matching. In these papers, many-
to-many matching games allow identification of certain features of the observable component
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of the surplus function when agents share some but not all partners. This allows differencing
the surplus generated from common match partners to learn valuations. In our setting,
many-to-one matching plays a different role in that it allows us to learn about the extent to
which unobservable characteristics of each side of the market drive the observed patterns.
Finally, our results on identification with many-to-one matching are based on techniques
for identifying non-linear measurement error models developed in Hu and Schennach (2008).
These techniques have been applied to identify auction models with unobserved heterogeneity
(Hu et al., 2013), and dynamic models with unobserved states (Hu and Shum, 2012). To our
knowledge, these techniques have not been previously used to identify matching models.
Section 2 presents the model, Section 3 discusses identification, Section 4 discusses esti-
mation results and Section 5 presents Monte Carlo results. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Model
We will consider a two-sided matching market with non-transferable utility. The two sides
will be referred to as workers and firms, with individual agents indexed by i and j respectively.
For simplicity, we assume that the total number of positions at firms equals the total number
of workers. Additional firms could be introduced in order to capture unmatched workers.
2.1 Market Participants
The participants in the market are described by a pair of probability measures me =
(mx,ε,mz,η). Here, mx,ε is the joint distribution of observable traits x ∈ χ ⊆ Rkx and un-
obsevable traits ε ∈ R for the workers. Likewise, mz,η is the joint distribution of observable
traits z ∈ ζ ⊆ Rkz × N and unobservable traits η ∈ R for the firms.
In an economy with n agents ((X1, ε1) , . . . , (Xn, εn)) and ((Z1, η1) , . . . , (Zn, ηn)) on each










j=1 δ(Zj ,ηj) where
δY is the dirac delta measure at Y.
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Assumption 1 The population measures mx,ε and mz,η are such that
(i) mη and mε admit densities with full support on R, and are absolutely continuous with
respect to Lebesgue measure.
(ii) η and ε are independent of X and Z respectively
Assumption 1 (i) imposes a regularity condition on the support and distributions of the
unobservables and Assumption 1 (ii) assumes independence. On its own, independence is
not particularly strong, but a restriction on preferences to follow will make this a strong
assumption.
2.2 Preferences
Each side of the economy has a utility function over observable and unobservable traits of the
other side of the economy. That is, worker i’s human capital index is given by the additively
separable form
v (xi, εi) = h (xi) + εi. (1)
Additive separability in the unobservables implies that the marginal value of observable traits
does not depend on the unobservable. We also assume that the firm derives a value vi from
each worker that is separable from the other workers matched to it.





= g (zj) + ηj. (2)




in ηj are strong assumptions when εi and ηj are independently distributed from xi and zj.
While this may be diffi cult to motivate, it is commonly used in discrete choice literature. This
paper is a first step towards providing theoretical results on identification and estimation in
this market, and these assumptions significantly ease the analysis.
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2.3 Pairwise Stability
Definition 1 Amatch is a probability measure µ on (χ× R)×(ζ × R) with marginals mx,ε
and mz,η respectively. A slot-match µS is a probability measure on (χ× R) × (ζ × R× S)
where S ⊆ N indexes slots.
A slot-match is relevant for considering a model with many-to-one matching, and induces
a unique match µ by marginalizing over slots. The traditional definition of a match used
in Roth and Sotomayor (1992) is based on a matching function µ∗ (i) 7→ J ∪ {i} where J
is the set of firms. With probability 1, such a function defines a unique counting measures




i,j=1 δ(Xi,εi,Zj ,ηj) where δ(Xi,εi,Zj ,ηj) > 0 only if i is matched to j in a
finite sample. This fact is a consquence of Assumption 1 (i), which implies that in a finite
economy, (z, η) identifies a unique firm with probability 1. 3
Definition 2 A match µ is pairwise stable if there do not exist two (measurable) sets
SI ⊆ χ × R and SJ ⊆ ζ × R in the supports of mx,ε and mz,η respectively, such that∫
SI
v (X, ε) dmx,ε >
∫
SI
v (X, ε) dµ (·, SJ) and
∫
SJ
u (Z, η) dmz,η >
∫
SJ
u (Z, η) dµ (SI , ·).
This definition of pairwise stability is also equivalent to that for a finite market since µ
is pairwise stable if and only if it does not have support on blocking pairs. Existence of a
pairwise stable match follows in a finite market because preferences are responsive (Roth
and Sotomayor, 1992) and uniqueness follows from alignment of preferences as disscussed in
Clark (2006) and Niederle and Yariv (2009).
Remark 1 In the model employed here the pairwise stable match µ has support on (x, ε, z, η)
only if FU (u (z, η)) = FV (v (x, ε)) where FU and FV are the cumulative distributions of u
and v respectively.
3In addition to a traditional matching function, in finite sample our definition also allows for fractional
matchings. However, such realizations are not observed in typical datasets on matches.
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Hence, this model exhibits full assortativity, so that the firm with the q-th quantile posi-
tion of value to the worker is matched with the worker with the q-th quantile of desirability
to the firm.
3 Identification
This section presents conditions under which we can the identify the functions h (x), g (z)
and the distributions of ε and η using the marginal distribution of the match µ on the
observables, χ × ζ. These objects allow determine the distribution of preferences, or the
probabilities
P (v (X1, ε1) > v (X2, ε2) |X1 = x,X2 = x′) (3)
and P (u (Z1, η1) > u (Z2, η2) |Z1 = z, Z2 = z′) . (4)
We make the following assumptions on h (·) and g (·)
Assumption 2 (i) h (x̄) = 0, |∇h (x̄)| = 1 and g (z̄) = 0, |∇g (z̄)| = 1
(ii) ε and η are median-zero
(iii) h (·) and g (·) have full support over R
(iv) h (·) and g (·) are differentiable
(v) The measures mx and mz admit bounded densities fX and fZ
(vi) The densities fε and fη are bounded, differentiable, and have a non-vanishing char-
acteristic function
Assumptions 2 (i) and (ii) impose scale and location normalizations that are necessary
and common in the discrete choice literature since the latent variables are not observed. Such
normalizations are necessary in single-agent discrete choice models and are without loss of
generality. Assumption 2 (iii) is a support condition often necessary for non-paramteric
identification. Assumption 2 (iv) - (vi) are regularity conditions.
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Assumption 3 At the pairwise stable match µ, the conditional distribution µ(z,η)|(x,ε) =
µ(z,η)|(x
′,ε′) if h (x) + ε = h (x′) + ε′ and µ(x,ε)|z,η = µ(x,ε)|(z
′,η′) if g (z) + η = g (z′) + η′.
This assumption requires that the desirability of an agent alone to determine the quality
of their matches, and not directly through the underlying traits. In other words, the sorting
observed in the data can depend only on the observable characteristics through their effect
on the desirability to the other side of the market. Without this assumption, sorting patterns
in the data may not be related to preferences.
3.1 Identification from Sorting Patterns
Data from one-to-one matches can be summarized as a joint distribution FXZ of observed
firm and worker traits. They allow assessing the sorting of worker observable traits to firm
observables. This section shows that such data are suffi cient for identifying certain preference
features on both sides of the market, but not the entire distribution of preferences on both
sides of the market. In fact, we show that the joint distribution is limited in its ability to
identify preferences.
3.2 Identification of Indifference Curves and a Sign-restriction
Our first result shows that h (·) and g (·) are identified up to monotone transformations using
only sorting patterns in the data.
Lemma 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 3, and the representation of preferences in equations
(1) and (2), the level sets of the functions h (·) and g (·) are identified a one-to-one observed
match µ.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
We can detemine whether or not two worker types x and x′ are equally desirable from
the sorting patterns observed in one-to-one, hence, also in many-to-one matches. Intutively,
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if two worker types have equal values of h (·), then the distributions of their desirability
to firms are identical. Consequently, the distribution of firms they match with are also
identical. In a pairwise stable match, under the additive structure of equations (1) and (2),
and independence of unobserved traits, the distribution of firm observable types these workers
are matched with turns out to be identical. Conversely, if two worker types are matched
with different distribution of firm observables, they cannot be identical in observable quality
because of Assumption 3.
While the level-sets of h (·) and g (·) are known, we cannot yet determine h (·) and g (·)
up to positive monotone transformations on either side of the market. In particular, it does
not tell whether a any given worker trait is desirable or not. Intuitively, assortative matching
between, say firm size and worker age, may result from either both traits being desirable or
both traits being undesirable. The next result shows that under a sign restriction only on
one side of the market, is suffi cient for identifying both h (·) and g (·) up to positive monotone
transformations.
Assumption 4 The function h (x) is strictly increasing in its first argument, x1. Further,
x1 has full support in R, and limx1→∞ h (x) =∞, limx1→−∞ h (x) = −∞.
Proposition 1 Assumption 4 and the conditions in Lemma 1 determine h (·) and g (·) up
to positive monotone transformations.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
The sign restriction allows us to order the level sets of h. Workers at higher level sets of
h also receive a more desirable distribution of firms. We can then use this to order the level
sets of g (·) as well. A symmetric result would hold under a sign restriction on g.
3.3 Limitations of Sorting Patterns: A Negative Result
Our next result shows a limitation of empirical content in data from one-to-one matches.
While these data are suffi cient to determine whether two traits, for example, worker traits
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x and x′, are equally desirable or not, knowing the probability that the worker with trait x
is chosen over x′. The approach is to show that the joint distribution FXZ generated by a
class of models satisfying Assumptions 1 - 4 can be rationalized with a modified model in
which ε ≡ 0. Such non-identification can be problematic for counterfactuals relying on the
probability of choices. For instance, the result implies that the data can be rationalized in a
model in which any worker with trait x is chosen over any worker with trait x′ if h (x) > h (x′)
even if this is not the case.
The class of models we consider satisfy the following condition:
Condition 1 The primitives h, g, FX,ε, FZ,η satisfy the conditions
(i) Fh(X)|V (h̄, v) = P
(
h (X) ≤ h̄|h (X) + ε = v
)
= γ(κh̄ − v) for some function γ and
constant κ
(ii) F−1V ◦ FU is a linear function
(iii) The functions h, g and fh(X)|V are twice continuously differentiable
While these conditions may seem restrictive at first glance, a large class of models sat-
isfy this condition and constructing examples is fairly straightforward. As we will show in
Example 2, these conditions are satisfied, for example, if h (x) and g (z) are linear, and X,
ε, Z and η are independent and normally distributed.
Proposition 2 Under Condition 1 and Assumptions 1 - 4, data from one-to-one matches
can be rationalized in a matching model with ε ≡ 0.
Proof. The proof proceeds by re-writing the matching model with ε ≡ 0 as a transforma-
tion model of Chiappori and Komunjer (2008), which they show is correctly specified. See
Appendix A.3 for details.
The result shows that despite imposing additional regularity conditions, data from one-
to-one matches can be rationalized using a model in which only one set of unobservables
are present. In these data, only the joint distribution of observable characteristics given
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by the match or sorting patterns are known. Logan et al. (2008) and Boyd et al. (2013)
employ empirical strategies that only use sorting patterns to estimate preferences. Our
non-identification result implies these point estimates may be sensitive to parametric as-
sumptions. As shown in the next section, data from many-to-one matching markets has
additional information that is useful for identification. The dataset used by Boyd et al.
(2013) contains this information, but their empirical strategy does not take advantage of it.
In the following example, we compute the joint distribution observed in the dataset for
a family of models that satisfy Condition 1 and show that a transformation model produces
the same data. Further, the same family of models can be used to compute a set of matching
models that are observationally equivalent with data from one-to-one matches.
Example 2 Let h (x) = x and g (z) = z. Assume that X, Z are distributed as N (0, 1)




respectively. The distributions of U and
V are therefore N
(
0, 1 + σ2η
)
and N (0, 1 + σ2ε) respectively. It is straightforward to show



















Condition 1 is therefore satisfied since the density fX|V (x, v) depends only on the difference
x− 1
1+σ2ε
v, F−1V ◦FU is linear, and the density of a normal distribution is twice-continuously
differentiable.
We now compute the conditional distribution FX|Z. Since the model exhibits full assor-
tativity, the distribution of X|Z = z is given by the distribution of
1
1 + σ2ε
F−1V ◦ FU (z + η) + ε1

























. The joint distribution FXZ produced by this model is identical
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Further note that the joint distribution as given in (5), produced by the above model is









(1 + σ2ε) = κ are observationally equivalent with data from one-to-one
matches.
The example shows that Proposition 2 is not pathalogical. We further illustrate the
nature of non-identification in Section 3.5 using a simulated objective function. The problem
in these simulations is allieviated when data from many-to-one matching markets is observed
and used.
3.4 Identification from Many-to-One Matches
We now show that data from many-to-one matching markets can be used to identify the
model. We consider a limit dataset in which there are a large number of firms, and each firm
has two workers. We assume that dataset does not distinguish directly between workers,
and we arbitrarily label the slots occupied by each worker as slots 1 and 2, independently
of the firm and worker characteristics. In such a dataset, with finitely many firms, the data
consist of the joint distribution FX1,X2,Z where X1 and X2 are the observed characteristics
of the two workers employed at a firm with observable characteristic Z. By the assumption
that the slots are independently labelled, we have that FX1|Z = FX2|Z .
Our main result is that the distribution of U |Z and V |X is identified in such a dataset.
Theorem 3 Under Assumptions 1 - 4, the functions h (·), g (·) and the densitites fη and fε
are identified from observing data from two-to-one matching, i.e. fz,x1,x2.
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Proof. See appendix A.4.
The proof proceeds by interpretting our model in terms of a measurement error model,
and employing techniques in Hu and Schennach (2008) to prove identification. More specifi-
cally, if we augment the joint distribution fX1,X2,Z by the latent quantile q of utility afforded
by a specific firm to workers, then we can write
fX1,X2,Z,q (x1, x2, z, q) = fX1|q (x1|q) fX2|q (x2|q) fZ|q (z|q) fq (q) ,
where fq (q) = 1, fX1|q (x1|q) is the conditional density at x1 given that h (x1) + ε = F−1V (q),
and analogously for fX2|q (x2|q) and fZ|q (z|q). Intuitively, this simplification arises from the
assumption that preferences are homogeneous, which implies perfect assortative matching
on v and u. As noted earlier, the distribution of worker (firm) characteristics that a firm
(worker) expects to match with under Assumption 3 only depends on its quality, and in
this case the relevant quantile in the quality of all other agents on the same side. Hence,
conditional on q, the random variablesX1, X2 and Z are independent. The quantile therefore
presents the role of the latent index that determines the joint distribution of the observables
in a model similar to the measurement error model of Hu and Schennach (2008).4
A loose interpretation is that the observed worker/firm characteristics present a noisy
measures of the true quality of the partners matched with each other. Agarwal (2013)
discusses this intuition in the context of the medical residency market. The argument is
that if the medical school quality of a resident is highly predictive of human capital, then
the variation within program in human capital should be low. If unobservables such as test
scores and recommendations are important, then residency programs should be matched
with medical residents from varying medical school quality. Our results formally show the
usefulness of data from many-to-one matching. We therefore recommend the use of this
4There is a technical difference in our model and Assumption 5 in Hu and Schennach (2008) related
to the unique indexing of the latent eigenvalues. While Hu and Schennach (2008) assume that a known
functional maps the eigenvalues, say f (x1|q) to an observable quantity, we do not need this assumption
since the distribution of quantiles is known to be uniform. Details are in the appendix.
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information when available.
3.5 Importance of Many-to-oneMatch Data: Simulation Evidence
The identification results presented in the previous section relied on observing data from
many-to-one matching, and shows that the model is not identified using data from one-to-
one matches. In this section, we present simulation evidence from a parametric version of
the model to elaborate on the nature of non-identification and to illustrate the importance of
using information from many-to-one matching in estimation. Although the formal identifica-
tion results were based on many workers per firm, we will be able to illustrate the empirical
information in many-to-one matching even in simulations with only a few workers per firm.
We simulate a dataset of pairwise stable matches from a simple model and then com-
pare objective functions of a method of simulated moments estimator that is constructed
from moments only using information present in sorting patterns to another that also use
information from many-to-one matching. The dataset of paiwise stable matches is simulated
from a model of the form
vi = xiα + εi
uj = zjβ + ηj
where xi, zj, εi, ηj are distributed as standard normal random variables. These parametric
assumptions are identical to those used in Example 2. We generate a sample using J = 500
firms, each firm j has capacity qj drawn uniformly at random from {1, . . . , 10}. The number
of workers in the simulation is N =
∑
cj. A pairwise stable match µ : {1, . . . , N} →
{1, . . . , J} is computed for α = 1 and β = 1. Using the same draw of observables and firm
capacities, the variables εi and ηj are simulated S = 1000 times, and a pairwise stable match
µθs can be computed for each s ∈ {1, . . . , S} as a function of θ = (α, β). We then compute
17

















































The first set, ψ̂ov and ψ̂
S
ov (θ), captures the degree of assortativity between the characteristics
x and z in the pairwise stable matches in the generated data, and as a function of θ. For
a given α > 0 (likewise β > 0), this covariance should be increasing in β (likewise α). The
second set, ψ̂w and ψ̂
S
w (θ) capture the within-firm variation in the characteristic x. If the
value of α is large, we can expect that workers with very different values of x are unlikely to be
of the same quantile. Hence, the within-firm variation in x will be small. Using both sets of
moments, we construct an objective function Q̂ (θ) =

















and W indexes the norm.
Figure 1(a) presents a contour plot of an objective function that only penalizes deviations
of ψ̂ov from ψ̂
S
ov (θ). This objective function only using information in the sorting between x
and z to differentiate values of θ. We see that pairs of parameters, α and β, with large values
of α and small values of β yield identical values of the objective function. These contour
sets result from identical values of ψ̂
S
ov (θ), illustrating that this moment cannot distinguish
between values along this set. In particular, the figure shows that the objective function has
a trough containing the true parameter vector with many values of θ yielding similar values
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of the objective function.
In Figure 1(b), we consider an objective function that only penalizes deviations of ψ̂w
from ψ̂
S
w (θ). The vertical contours indicate that the moment is able to clearly distinguish
values of α because the moment ψ̂
S
w (θ) is strictly decreasing in α. However, the shape of the
objective function indicates that this moment cannot distinguish different values of β.
Finally, the plots of an objective function that penalizes deviations from both m̂w and m̂ov
(Figure 1(c)) show that we can combine information from both sets of moments to identify
the true parameter. Unlike the other two figures, this objective function displays a unique
minimum close to the true parameter. Together, Figures 1(a)-(c) illustrate the importance
of using both these types of moments in estimating our model.
4 Estimation
In this section, we assume that the latent utilities of workers for firms and vice-versa are
known up to a finite dimensional parameter θ ∈ Θ ⊆ RKθ . The utilities are generated by
u (z, η; θ) = g (z; θ) + η
v (x, ε; θ) = h (x; θ) + ε
where g : ζ ×Θ→ R and h : χ×Θ→ R are known-functions that are Lipschitz-continuous
in each of their arguments. We assume that the densities fε and fη are known. Similar
parametric assumptions are common in the discrete choice literature where one may assume
a normal or an extreme value type I distribution for the unobservable ε.
Our results are for a sample of J firms, each with c̄ = 2 slots each, and consider the
properties of an estimator as J →∞. The number of workers is N = c̄J . The characteristics
of each worker are sampled from the measure mx,ε and the characteristics of the firm are
sampled from mz,η.
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We will study the estimator defined by
θN = arg min
θ∈Θ
‖ψN − ψN (θ)‖W , (8)
where ψN are finite-dimensional moments computed from the sample, ψN (θ) are computed
from the observed sample of firms and workers as a function of θ, and W defines a norm.
For instance, we may use a quadratic form in the difference (ψN − ψN (θ)), yielding a GMM
estimator.
Let mu, mv be the image measures of mz,η and mx,ε under u (z, η; θ0) and v (x, ε; θ0)
respectively, and muN ,m
v
J be their empirical analogues. We will treat these densities as
known functions. Let Ψ : χ× χ× ζ → RKΨ be a moment function. We make the following
assumption:
Assumption 5 (i) Ψ (x1, x2, z) is bounded with bounded partial derivatives and symmetric
in x1 and x2
(ii) The densities fε and fη are bounded with bounded derivatives and have full support
on the real line
(iii) mx and mz admit densities fX and fZ
(iv) The conditional densities fX|v (x) and fZ|u (z) have uniformly bounded derivatives.
The symmetry of Ψ (x1, x2, z) in the first two arguments ensures that there is no distinc-
tion between the two positions at any given firm. The remaining conditions are regularity
conditions.
The data consist of N = 2J matches, {(x2j−1, x2j, zj)}Jj=1, and can be used to construct






Ψ (x2j−1, x2j, zj) . (9)
The moments discussed previously, in equations (6a) and (7a), are given by particular choices
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for Ψ.




, it will be
convenient to first sample N and J draws from mv and mu respectively, and then sample
xi|vi and zj|uj from their respective conditional distributions. This sampling process has an




as sampling directly frommx,ε andmz,η directly.
In the population dataset, firms with the q-th quantile of mv are matched with workers
on the q-th quantile of mu. With the sampling process described above in mind, the moment






F−1v (q) , F
−1
v (q) , F
−1
u (q) ; θ0
)
dq
where Fv and Fu are the cdf corresponding to mv and mu respectively and ψ̃ (v1, v2, u) is
the expectation of Ψ (X1, X2, Z) given that X1 and X2 are drawn from mx|v and Z is drawn
from mz|u. The term ψ̃ (v1, v2, u) can be written as
ψ̃ (v1, v2, u; θ) =
∫




Ψ (X1, X2, Z) fε (v − h (X1; θ)) fε (v − h (X2; θ)) fη (u− g (Z; θ)) dmxdmxdmz∫
fε (v − h (X1; θ)) fε (v − h (X2; θ)) fη (u− g (Z; θ)) dmxdmxdmz
.
Our first result shows that the empirical analog in equation (9) converge at the true
parameter θ0 to ψ.
Proposition 3 Let ψk and ψkN denote the k-th dimensions of ψ and ψN respectively. If
Assumption 5 is satisfied, then for each k ∈ {1, . . . , KΨ}, ψkN − ψk converges in probability
to 0.
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
The primary technical diffi culty arises from the dependent data nature of the observed
matches. By re-writing the sampling process as one in which the utilities u and v are drawn
first, we can condition on the utility-matches in the data. The observed characteristics of the
matched agents are then sampled conditional on this utility draw. This sampling process,
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although identical to drawing the characteristics directly from mx,ε and mz,η, allows a more
tractable approach to proving consistency of the moments. The proof technique is based on
leveraging the triangular array structure implied by this process: the individual components
of the triple (X1, X2, Z) are independent conditional on the utilities drawn.
For estimation, we also need to consider the population and empirical analogs of ψ






F−1v;θ (q) , F
−1
v;θ (q) , F
−1
u;θ (q) ; θ
)
dq
where Fv;θ (v) =
∫ v
−∞ Fε (v − h (X; θ)) dm
x, Fu;θ (u) =
∫ u
−∞ Fη (u− g (Z; θ)) dm
z and ψ̃ is
defined in equation (10) above. We study an estimator that uses the following sample






F−1N,v;θ (q) , F
−1
N,v;θ (q) , F
−1
J,u;θ (q) ; θ0
)
dq (11)
ψ̃N (v1, v2, u; θ) =
∫
Ψ (X1, X2, Z) fε (v1 − h (X; θ)) fε (v2 − h (X; θ)) fη (u− g (Z; θ)) dmxNdmxNdmzJ∫
fε (v1 − h (X; θ)) fε (v2 − h (X; θ)) fη (u− g (Z; θ)) dmxNdmxNdmzJ
,
where FN,v;θ and FJ,u;θ are empirical cdf functions from a random sample from Fv;θ,mxN (v) =∫ v
−∞ Fε (v − h (X; θ)) dm
x
N and Fv;θ,mzJ (v) =
∫ u
−∞ Fη (u− g (Z; θ)) dm
z
J respectively. ψN (θ)
can be computed by first drawing ε and η to simulate FN,v;θ and FJ,u;θ, and then using
the expression in equation (11) to compute ψN (θ). It may also be possible to create a
simulation analog of ψN (θ), that uses a second simulation step to approximate the integral.
More specifically, we may independently sample from the conditional distributions of X and
Z given the measures mxN and m
z
J and simulated values of vi and uj.
The next result proves uniform convergence of the difference ψ (θ) − ψN (θ;mxN ,mzJ), a
result required for consistency of the estimator.









J) respectively. If Assumptions 5(i) - (iii) are satisfied, then for each k ∈
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{1, . . . , KΨ},
∣∣ψk (θ)− ψkN (θ;mxN ,mzJ)∣∣ converges in outer probability to 0 uniformly in θ.
Proof. See Appendix B.3.
Again, the proof leverages the triangular sampling structure, conditioning on the drawn
utilities. The first step is to prove that the cumulative distribution of utilities converge
uniformly in θ as the sampled observed characteristics, mxN and m
z
J converge to their pop-
ulation analogs. Given this, we can take advantage of the triangular structure to construct
the expected value of Ψ given an empirical distribution of sampled utilities by computing
ψ̃N (v1, v2, u; θ) along the quantiles of FN,v;θ and FJ,u;θ.
The proof is not a direct extension of techniques in Proposition 3. Intuitively, the par-
ticular triples (X1, X2, Z) that are matched are less tractable across values of θ. This is
because the pairings depend on the ranks of given observations, which depends on both the
overall utility of the observation and the utilities of other observations. Both these vary with
the value of θ, and depend on the realized unobservables ε or η paired in the sample with
the observed worker or firm characteristic. The quantity ψ̃N (v1, v2, u; θ), on the other hand,
does not depend on this pairing and makes an analysis across values of θ tractable. To show
that ψN satisfies a law of large numbers, however, we did not need to consider the behaviour
of the sample at values of θ other than θ0.
Finally, we use the following standard assumptions to prove consistency of the estimator
defined in equation (8).
Assumption 6 (i) The parameter space Θ is compact
(ii) There is a unique θ0 ∈ Θ for which ψ (θ) = ψ (θ0)
(iii) For any ε > 0, there exists a δ > 0 such that ‖ψ (θ)− ψ (θ0)‖W ⇒ ‖θ − θ0‖ < ε
(iv) The norm ‖·‖W is continuous in its argument
Theorem 4 Let θ̂N = arg minθ∈Θ ‖ψN − ψN (θ)‖W . If Assumptions 5 and 6 are satisfied,
then θ̂N converges in probability to θ0.
Proof. See Appendix B.4.
23
5 Monte Carlo Evidence
This section presents Monte Carlo evidence of a simulation based estimator from synthetic
datasets of varying size and models of varying complexity to assess the properties of a method
of simulated moments estimator. The results are presented for a simulation based estimator
of the form
θ̂N = arg min
θ∈Θ








ψN − ψN,S (θ)
)]1/2
(13)
where ψN is as defined in equation (9) and ψNS (θ) is computed by averaging over S = 100
simulations as follows. For each simulation s, we sample the unobservables εi and ηj, compute
the unique pairwise stable match and compute ψN,s (θ) for the simulated matches. The




s ψN,s (θ). The moments used are as defined in equations (6a) and
(7a). One within moment is included for each observed component of x. The overall moments
include each component of x interacted with each component of z.
We begin by assessing the performance of the estimator for the double-vertical model
which is the focus of the theoretical results presented in the paper. We also present Monte
Carlo evidence on models with workers having heterogeneous preferences for firms although
we do not have formal theory on those models.
5.1 Design of Monte Carlo Experiments
Our Monte Carlo experiments vary the number of programs, J ∈ {100, 500}, and the max-
imum number of residents matched with each program c̄ ∈ {5, 10}. For each program j,
the capacity cj is chosen uniformly at random from {1, . . . , c̄}. The number of residents is a
random variable set at N =
∑
cj. We will use up to three characteristics for residents and
up to four characteristics for programs. The characteristics zj of program j are distributed
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as
zj = (zj1, zj2, zj3) ∼ N (a, I3)
where a = (1, 2, 3, 4) and I3 is a 3 × 3 identity matrix. The characteristics of the residents,
xi are distributed as
xi = (xi1, xi2, xi3, xi4) ∼ N (b, I4)
where b = (1, 2, 3) and I4 is a 4× 4 identity matrix.
For each model specification, we generate 500 samples indexed by b and parameter esti-
mates θ̂b.5 The confidence intervals are generated by using a parametric bootstrap described
in Appendix C.
5.2 Results
5.2.1 The Double Vertical Model
We present Monte Carlo evidence from a model with no preference heterogeneity. The
preferences are of the form,
vi = xiα + εi (14a)
uj = zjβ + ηj (14b)
where εi ∼ N (0, 1) and ηj ∼ N (0, 1). Table 1 presents results from two specifications. The
specification in Column (1) has a single observable characteristic on each side of the market
and column (2) has two observable characteristics. With few exceptions, the bias, the root
mean squared error (RMSE) and the standard error fall with J and q̄ for both specifications.
The coverage ratios of 95% confidence intervals constructed from the proposed bootstrap
approximation are mostly between 90% and 98%, particularly for simulations with a larger
sample sizes, particularly for estimates of α. Also notice that estimates for α are more precise
5The b−th (pseudo-random) sample is generated from a Mersenne Twister algorithm with the seed b.
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than estimates of β in both specifciations and all sample sizes.
5.2.2 Heterogeneous Preferences
Preference models without heterogeneity may be quite restrictive for some empirical appli-
cations. While we do not have formal results on identification or estimation of models with
preference heterogeneity, we present Monte Carlo evidence from a model in which workers
have heterogeneous preferences for firms. We conduct Monte Carlo simulations for pairwise
stable matches using preference models of the form
vi = xiα + εi (15a)
uij = zjβ +
∑
k,l
γkl × xi,k × zj,l + ηj (15b)
where εi ∼ N (0, 1) and ηj ∼ N (0, 1). In this model, workers have varying preferences
for the firm characteristic z based on their characteristic x. Table 2 presents results from
two specifications, one with one interaction term and another with two interactions. As in
the model with no preference heterogeneity, the bias, root mean square error falls with J
and c̄, and the coverage ratios are close to correct. The result suggests that a simulation
based estimator for the model with preference heterogeneity may have desirable large sample
properties as well.
6 Conclusion
This paper provides results on the identification and estimation of preferences from data from
a matching market described by pairwise stability and non-transferable utility, when data
only on final matches are observed. Our results are restricted to the case when preferences
on both sides are homogeneous. We show that using information available in many-to-one
matching is necessary and suffi cient for non-parametric identification if data on a single
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large market is observed. We also prove consistency of an estimator for a parametric class
of models. Finally, we present Monte Carlo evidence on a simulation based estimator.
There are several avenues for future research on both identification and estimation for
similar models. While we show that it is necessary to use information from many-to-one
matching for identification with data on a single large market, it may be possible to use
variation in the characteristics of market participants for identification. This can be partic-
ularly important for the emprical study of marriage markets in the non-transferable utility
framework. Our formal results are also restricted to the case with homogeneous preferences
on both sides of the market. Extending this domain of preferences is particularly important.
A treatment of heterogeneous preferences on both sides of the market may be of particu-
lar interest, but may need to confront diffi culties arising from the multiplicity of equilibria.
Finally, we have also left the exploration of computationally more tractable estimators for
future research.
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(a) Sorting Moments Only
(b) Within-program Moments Only
(c) All Moments
Figure 1: Importance of Many-to-one Matches: Objective Function Contours
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A Proofs: Identification
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
As noted in Remark 1, the q-th quantile of each side matches with the q-th quantile of the
other. If FU and FV are the distributions of utilities on each side, the match operator on
utilities, which determines the worker quality index v that a firm of quality u is matched
with, is given by F−1V ◦ FU . Note that these are both monotonically increasing.








Fh(X) (v − ε) dFε, (16)
where Fh(X) is the cdf of the random variable h (X). Note that Tε is strictly increasing (wrt
the partial order induced by First Order Stochastic Dominance) in Fh(x). Let T−1ε be the
associated inverse transform, which exists since ε admits a density and is strictly increasing
since it is the inverse of a monotone operator. Let Tη be a convolution with Fη.




◦ F−1V ◦ FU
where δh(x) is the dirac delta measure at h (x). The distribution on g (Z) that a given h (x)




◦ F−1V ◦ FU ◦ T−1η . Since a composition of strictly increasing




◦ F−1V ◦ FU ◦ T−1η is strictly increasing in δh(x).
Now consider two values x1, x2 ∈ suppmx such that µ (x1, ·) = µ (x2, ·) where µ is the













◦ F−1V ◦ FU ◦ T−1η . Therefore, it must be
that µ (x1, ·) 6= µ (x2, ·) since the associated cdfs satisfy Fg(Z)|X=x1 >FOSD Fg(Z)|X=x2 .
Conversely, if h (x1) = h (x2), we have that the distributions of g (z) matched with x1








◦F−1V ◦FU ◦ T−1η . Assumption
3 implies that the distribution of z that x1 and x2 are matched with are also identical, i.e.
µ (x1, ·) = µ (x2, ·).
Hence, h (x1) = h (x2) if and only if µ (x1, ·) = µ (x2, ·), which is known from the data.
A symmetric argument identifies the level sets of g (·).
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Identification of h up to a positive monotone transformation follows immediately from
Lemma 1 and Assumption 4.
To show identification of g (·), note that the proof of Proposition 1, although stated









◦F−1U ◦FV ◦T−1ε i.e. the distribution of h (x)matching with z1 dominates
the distribution for z2. This notion of dominance is invariant to positive transformations of
h (x). Hence, we can order the level sets of g (·).
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
The proof proceeds by rewriting the matching model with ε ≡ 0 in terms of the transforma-
tion model of Chiappori and Komunjer (2008). We will appeal to Chiappori and Komunjer
(2008), Proposition 2 stating that the transformation model is correctly specified. We verify
that the conditional distribution FX|Z produced by the matching model satisfies the hypoth-
esis of the proposition.
In what follows, we will treat X and Z as known scalars with h (·) and g (·) as increasing
functions of them respectively. This simplification is without loss of generality since under
the hypotheses of the result, Proposition 1 guarantees that h (·) and g (·) are known up to
positive monotone transformations. Since X and Z are uni-dimensional, Assumption A3 of
Chiappori and Komunjer (2008) is then equivalent to strict exogeneity of ε and η from X
and Z respectively, as maintained under the hypotheses of Proposition 2.
In the matching model, quantiles of h (X)+ε are matched with quantiles of g (Z)+η. We
will use Proposition 2 of Chiappori and Komunjer (2008) to show that there exist increasing
functions Γ̄, ḡ, Fη̄ such that the the tranformation model
h (X) = Γ̄ (ḡ (Z) + η̄)
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rationalizes any joint distribution FXZ from a matching model satisfying Assumptions 1 - 4
and Condition 1. This is model is equivalent to a matching model with h̄ = Γ̄−1 ◦ h, ε ≡ 0,
and Fη̄, ḡ.
Let the probability that a firm with obserable trait z is matched with workers with h (X)


























κh̄− A (g (z) + η)
)
dFη,
for some constant A. The first equality is derived from the quantile-quantile matching of
workers and firms and the second equality follows from Conditions 1 (i) and 1 (ii).
First, we ensure that Φ has continuous third order partial derivatives ∂3Φ(h̄, z)/∂h̄∂2z
and ∂3Φ(h̄, z)/∂2h̄∂z, and that ∂Φ(h̄, z)/∂h̄ > 0. Twice-differentiability of h, g and fX|V





strictly increasing in h̄, we have that ∂Φ(h̄, z)/∂h̄ > 0.




satisfies Condition C in Chiappori and Komunjer (2008),

















































Note that γ′ exists since the existence of densities fX , fε and differentiability of h (·) implies


























log |κ| − log
∣∣∣∣A∂g (z)∂z1
∣∣∣∣) = 0.
The last equality follows since log
∣∣∣∂g(z)∂z1 ∣∣∣ and log |κ| do not depend on h̄.
We now show that equations (4) and (5) in Chiappori and Komunjer (2008) are satisfied.
Since Fh(X)|V
(
h̄, A (g (z) + η)
)
is a cdf, it is bounded, limh̄→−∞ FX|V
(





h̄, A (g (z) + η)
)
= 1 for each z and η. Hence, limx→−∞Φ (x, z) = 0 and
limx→∞Φ (x, z) = 1.
To verify (5), note that
∫ h̄
0
∂Φ (a, z) /∂x
∂Φ (a, z) /∂z1
∂Φ (0, z) /∂z1















Condition (5) follows since h (X) has full support on R.
By Proposition 2 of Chiappori and Komunjer (2008), there exist Γ̄, ḡ, Fη̄ that rationalize
Φ.
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A.4 Preliminaries for Theorem 3
In what follows we treat x and z as single dimensional variable that are uniformly distrib-
uted on [0, 1]. As noted earlier in the proof of Proposition 2, due to Proposition 1, this
simplification is without loss of generality.
Let v = h (x) + ε, where h (x) is strictly increasing with h (x̄) = 0, h′ (x̄) = 1 and let
ε be median zero with density fε. For quantile τ ∈ [0, 1], let fτ |X (τ , x) be the density






F−1V (τ)− h (x)
)
, where FV (v) =∫
Fε (v − h (x)) dFX .
Lemma 2 The function h (x) and the density fε are identified from fτ |x (τ) if h (x) is dif-
ferentiable.
Proof. Let φ (x, x′) be the probability that h (x) + ε > h (x′) + ε′ given x and x′. φ (x, x′) is
identified from fτ |x (τ) since it can be written as





fτ |X (τ , x) fτ |X (τ
′, x′) dτdτ ′.
However, φ (x, x′) can also be written in terms of the primitives h (·) and fε as
φ (x, x′) =
∫
Fε (h (x) + ε− h (x′)) fε (ε) dε.























Since h′ (x̄) is known, h′ (x) can be determined everywhere. The boundary conditions h (0) =
1 provides the unique solution to the resulting differential equation determining h (·).
We now need to show that Fε is identified. Let Rx (t) be the (utility-) rank distribution
of x, i.e. the probability that the utility of x is below the t-quantile in utility distributions,
P
(
h (x) + ε ≤ F−1V (t) |x
)
. Rx (t) is known since it is equal to
∫ t
0
fτ |x (τ) dτ . Since F−1V is
continuous and ε admits a density, Rx (t) is continuous and strictly increasing in t. Let
τ ∗ be the median rank of x̄, i.e. Rx̄ (t∗) = 12 . Since ε is median-zero, h (x̄) = 0 and
P
(




, we have that F−1V (t
∗) = 0. For any x, Rx (t∗) is therefore
the probability that h (x) + ε ≤ 0 given x, i.e. Rx (t∗) = Fε (−h (x)). Since h (x), Rx (t∗) is
known and has full support on R, Fε is identified.
Lemma 3 If fε has a non-vanishing characteristic function and h (x) has full-support on
R, then for any function m (v), we have that
∫
fε (v − h (x))m (v) dv = 0 for all x implies
that m (v) = 0. Hence, fv|x (v|x) = fε (v − h (x)) is complete.
Proof. Note that
∫
fε (v − h (x))m (v) dv =
∫
fε (ε)m (h (x) + ε) dε
is a convolution of m (·) with ε. Since fε has a non-vanishing characteristic, so does f−ε.
Therefore, completeness follows from Mattner (1993), Theorem 2.1.
For a function m, define the operator Lx|q as Lx|q (m) =
∫
f (x|q)m (q) dq where f (x|q)
is the conditional distribution of X given Q = q.
Lemma 4 Lx1|q is injective if (i) fε has a non-vanishing characteristic function (ii) FV is
continuous and strictly increasing and (iii) h (x) has full-support on R
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Proof. We first rewrite the operator Lx|q as a convolution:
Lx|q (m) =
∫
f (x|q)m (q) dq
=
∫
f (x|v)m (FV (v)) fV (v) dv
=
∫
fε (v − h (x))M (v) dv
where the second equality follows from a change of variables. Let M (v) = m (FV (v)). By
Lemma 3, fε (v − h (x)) is complete. Since FV is bijective, m (q) = 0 for all q. Therefore,
f (x|q) is complete, and as noted in HS, implies that Lx|q is injective.
Lemma 5 Lx1|x2 is injective if (i) fε has a non-vanishing characteristic function and (ii)
h (x) has full-support on R
Proof. Note that
∫
fx1|x2 (x1|x2)m (x2) dz2 =
∫ (∫















fε (v − h (x1)) f (v|x2)m (x2) dx2dv
=
∫
fε (v − h (x1))
(∫
fε (v − h (x2))m (x2) dx2
)
dv
where we use (i) f (x1|q, x2) = f(x1,q|x2)f(q|x2) , (ii) a change of variables FV (v) = q, (iii) f (x1|v) =
fε(v−h(x1))
fV (v)
and (iv) a change in the order of integration by Fubini’s theorem.
By Lemma 3, fε (v − h (x1)) is complete, and consequently,
∫
fx1|x2 (x1|x2)m (x2) dx2 = 0
implies
∫
fε (v − h (x2))m (x2) dx2 = 0 for all v. A second application of Lemma 3 implies
that m (x) = 0 for all x (since fε (v − h (x2)) is complete). Hence, fx1|x2 (x1|x2) is complete,





fx|q (x|q)m (q) dq = 0 for all x, implies that m (q) = 0 if (i) fε has a non-





















fε (v − h (x)) m̃ (v) dv
where the first equality follows from the definition of q, and the second equality follows from
a change of variables q = FV (v). The last expression is a convolution of m̃ with respect to




fε (v − h (x)) m̃ (v) dv = 0 implies that m̃ (v) = 0. Since 0 < fV (v) < ∞
for all v ∈ R, we have that m̃ (v) = 0 implies m (FV (v)) fV (v) = 0, and m (FV (v)) for all v.
Hence, ∆x|qm (q) = 0 implies that m (q) = 0 for all q.
Our final preliminary result will use the following condition defining a set of eigenvalues
fx|q (x|q):
Condition 2 (i) For all q∗1 6= q∗2 ∈ [0, 1], the set
{




(ii) fx|q (x|q) continuously differentiable in q
(iii) for all q ∈ (0, 1), there exists and x, such that ∂fx|q(x|q)
∂q
6= 0




fx|q (x|q)m (q) dq = 0 for all x, implies that m (q) = 0
Lemma 7 Consider two conditional distributions f̃q̃ (x|q̃) and fq (x|q) satisfying Condition
2. If there exists a bijection Q : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] such that f̃q̃ (x|Q (q)) = fq (x|q) then Q is the
identity.
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Proof. Note that the function fx|q (x|q) = fε
(
F−1U (q)− g (x)
)
is a particular family of
eigenfunctions that satisfy the assumptions of the theorem. We will show that if there exists
a reindexing f̃x|q̃ (x|q̃) of q via a bijectionQ : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] such that f̃x|q̃ (x|Q (q)) = fx|q (x|q)
(Assumption HS.4 requires Q (q) to be injective on [0, 1] and the support assumption in the
hypothesis implies surjectivity). If fq (q) = 1 and fq̃ (q̃) = 1, then Q (·) is the identity.




fx|q (x|q) dq =
∫ 1
0
f̃x|q (x|q) dq =
∫ 1
0
fx|q (x|Q (q)) dq.
A change of variables, v = Q (q) yields that
∫ 1
0
fx|q (x|Q (q)) dq =
∫ 1
0








The second inequality follows from the inverse function theorem. Differentiability ofQ follows
from the implicit function theorem: Q (q) is defined implicitly from f̃x|q̃ (x|Q)−fx|q (x|q) = 0,
where for every Q there exists x such that f̃x|q̃ (x|Q) has a non-zero derivative under the




fx|q (x|q) dq −
∫ 1
0
















⇒ Q′ (q) = 1.
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Therefore Q (·) is the identity.
A.5 Proof of Theorem 3
In what follows we treat x and z as single dimensional variable that are uniformly dis-
tributed on [0, 1], and h (·) and g (·) are increasing. This simplification is without loss of
generality given identification of g (x) and h (z) up to a positive monotone transformation
by Proposition 1.
The proof follows from recasting the matching model in terms of the non-classical mea-
surement error model similar to Hu and Schennach (2008), (henceforth HS) to first identify
fx|q (x|q) and fz|q (z|q), which are the conditional distributions of x and z respectively given




We begin by verifying Assumptions HS.1-HS.4. We prove Assumption HS.1 by showing
that the joint density of z, x1, x2, q is bounded wrt. Lebesgue measure and has bounded
marginals. By Assumption 3, fz, x1, x2, q (z, x1, x2, q) = fZ|q (z|q) fX|q (x1|q) fX|q (x2|q) fq (q)
where fq (q) = 1, fz|q (z|q) = fη
(
F−1U (q)− g (z)
)
fZ (z), and fX|q (x|q) = fη
(
F−1V (q)− g (x)
)
fX (x).
Assumption 2(v) and (vi) imply that both fz|q (z|q) and fX|q (x|q) are bounded, hence satis-
fying Assumption HS.1. Assumption 4 implies Assumption HS.2. Assumption HS.3 requires
that Lx|q and Lx1|x2 are injective, where, for variables a, b,
La|b (g) =
∫
fa|b (a|b) g (b) db.
Lemmas 5 and 4 imply that under Assumptions 2(iii) and 2(vi), Lx|q and Lx1|x2 are injective.
Finally, Assumption HS.4 is satisfied since the conditional distributions of Z and X given q
are strictly increasing (in the sense of First Order Stochastic Dominance) in q.
6For the double-vertical matching model, the latent variable x∗ in HS will be labelled q, the outcome y
in HS is instead z, x in HS is x1 and z in HS is x2.
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For a function m (·), and variables x and q, define the operator
∆x;qm (q) = fx|q (x|q)m (q)
as in HS. Since f (z, x1|x2) is observed, for any real valued function m, we can compute
∫
f (z, x1|x2)m (x2) dx2 = Lx1|q ◦∆z;q ◦ Lq|x2 (m)
as shown in HS. Further, HS show that under assumptions HS.1 - HS.4 the conditional
densities fZ|q (z|q) and fX|q (x|q) are identified upto a reindexing via an injection Q (·) where
q̃ = Q (q).
If Assumption HS.5 were true, we could use it to show that Q is the identity, completing
the proof. However, instead of imposing an additional assumption, we use Lemma 7 to
show directly, that Q must be the identity under Assumption 2(vi). To apply Lemma 7,
we need to show that fx|q (x|q) = fε
(
F−1V (q)− h (x)
)
and fz|q (z|q) = fη
(
F−1U (q)− g (z)
)
where q are quantiles satisfies Condition 2. Since the proof is symmetric, we show this only
for fx|q (x|q). Condition 2(i) is satisfied, as noted earlier, since the conditional distributions
of X given q is strictly increasing (in the sense of First Order Stochastic Dominance) in q.







F−1V (q)− h (x)
)
and fV (v) > 0. To show Condition 2(iii), we first argue by contradiction to show that there




(x|q) 6= 0. = Assume that f ′ε (ε) = 0 for all ε∗ ∈ (−∞,∞). Since fε (ε)
is a density, it must therefore be a non-negative constant function with bounded support.
However, this contradicts Assumption 2(vi), which requires fε (ε) to have a non-vanishing
characteristic. Hence, it must be that f ′ε (ε
∗) 6= 0 for some ε∗ ∈ (−∞,∞). For q, pick








F−1V (q)− h (xq,ε∗)
)
6= 0. Condition 2(iv) follows from
Lemma 4 under Assumptions 2(iii) and 2(vi). We have thus verified Condition 2 for fx|q.
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An identical argument follows for fz|q.
Therefore, by Lemma 7, Q is the identity, the indexing of eigenvalues satisfying Condition
2 is unique. Hence, we have identified the quantities fx|q and fz|q. The proof is completed
by appealing to Lemma 2 to claim that the primitives h (·), g (·), fη and fε, are identified
from f (x|q) and f (z|q).
B Proofs: Estimation
B.1 Preliminaries






, if the density fX exists, is continuous and is bounded away from zero on[





∣∣F−1N,X (q)− F−1X (q)∣∣→ 0 in outer probability.
Proof. Follows from van der Vaart and Wellner (2000), Example 3.9.21 as a consequence of
the continuous mapping theorem.
Let v (x, ε; θ) = h (x; θ) + ε be Lipschitz continuous in (x, θ) and let ε have a coninuous




Fε (v − h (x; θ)) dmx
and denote the corresponding empirical cdf of a sample size N with FN,v;θ. This is the cdf
of the image mx,εN Assume θ ∈ Θ, compact.
Lemma 9 If fv;θ is bounded away from 0 for every compact set, then for each δ ∈ (0, 1),
supθ∈Θ,q∈[δ,1−δ]
∣∣F−1N,v;θ (q)− F−1v;θ (q)∣∣→ 0 in outer probability.
Proof. The result follows from the fact that the collection of sets, {(x, ε, θ) : h (x; θ) + ε ≤ v},
indexed by (v, θ) are Glivenko-Cantelli since ε admits a density and h (x, θ) is Lipschitz
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continuous. Note that mx,εN converges uniformly to m
x × mε over the collection of sets










where mv,θ and mv,θn are image measures of m
x,ε and mx,εN under v (x, ε; θ). Hence, for
λ ∈ (0, 1− δ) and measure mx,εN such that
















Since mv;θ has a density bounded away from 0 on every compact interval uniformly over θ,
we have that









Hence, the result follows by the continuous mapping theorem since ‖mx,εN −mx ×mε‖ → 0
by the law of large numbers.






ψ̃ (v1, v2, u)
=
∫




Ψ (X1, X2, Z) f̃v,x (v1, X1) f̃v,x (v2, X2) f̃u,z (u, Z) dm
xdmxdmz
where f̃v,x (v, x) =
fε (v − h (x; θ0))∫
fε (v − h (X; θ0)) dmx
and f̃u,z (u, z) =
fη (u− g (z, θ0))∫
fη (u− g (Z, θ0)) dmz
We will only show ψ̃ (v1, v2, u) has a bounded derivative in v1 as the proof for the other two
arguments are identical. Note that
∂
∂v
fε (v − h (x; θ0))∫
fε (v − h (X; θ0)) dmx
=
f ′ε (v − h (x; θ0))∫
fε (v − h (X; θ0)) dmx
− fε (v − h (x; θ0))
∫
f ′ε (v − h (X; θ0)) dmx(∫
fε (u− h (X; θ0)) dmx
)2 (18)
If the expression in equation (18) is mx integrable in x, and the terms fε(v−h(x;θ0))∫
fε(v−h(X;θ0))dmx and
fη(u−g(z,θ0))∫
fη(u−g(Z,θ0))dmz are respectively m
x and mz integrable, then the Dominated Convergence
Theorem implies that the derivative ∂
∂v1
ψ̃ (v1, v2, u) exists and is given by
∫
Ψ (X1, X2, Z)
∂
∂v1
f̃v,x (v1, X1) f̃v,x (v2, X2) f̃u,z (u, Z) dm
xdmxdmz.





f ′ε (v − h (x; θ0))∫
fε (v − h (X; θ0)) dmX
− fε (v − h (x; θ0))
∫
f ′ε (v − h (X; θ0)) dmX(∫









f ′η (u− g (z; θ0))∫
fη (u− g (Z, θ0)) dmz
−
fη (u− g (z, θ0))
∫
f ′η (u− g (Z, θ0)) dmz(∫











f ′ε (v − h (x; θ0))∫
fε (v − h (X; θ0)) dmX
− fε (v − h (x; θ0))
∫
f ′ε (v − h (X; θ0)) dmX(∫













by Assumption 5 (iii) and (iv).











f ′ε (v − h (x; θ0))∫
fε (v − h (X; θ0)) dmX
− fε (v − h (x; θ0))
∫
f ′ε (v − h (X; θ0)) dmX(∫






B.2 Proof of Proposition 3
We will use the following lemmata for the result, which are stated, for each dimension of ψ.
We omit the dimension index for notational simplicity.
Lemma 11 If Assumption 5 is satisfied, E (ψN |mvN ,muJ) − ψ converges in probability to 0
as N →∞.
Proof. The quantity E (ψN |mvN ,muJ) can be computed from the fact that for all 1 ≤ k ≤ J,
the k’th most desirable firm is occupied by the 2k-th and the (2k − 1)-th most desirable


















where FN,v and FJ,u are the cdfs representing the
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empirical measures mvN and m
u
J respectively:



































































− ψ → 0 (20)
and that R→ 0.































































By the triangle ineuqality, the absolute value of the k-th term in the summation is at most
1
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and sinceR1, R2 ≥ 0 and
∥∥∥∇ψ̃∥∥∥
∞
<∞ (Lemma 10), the sumR1+R2 converges in probability
to 0 by the uniform convergence of the quantile process of v on [δ, 1− δ] (Lemmata 9, 14).
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F−1N,v (q) , F
−1









F−1v (q) , F
−1











F−1N,v (q) , F
−1






F−1v (q) , F
−1














F−1N,v (q) , F
−1






F−1v (q) , F
−1























F−1N,v (q) , F
−1






F−1v (q) , F
−1









∣∣∣ψ̃ (F−1N,v (q) , F−1N,v (q) , F−1J,u (q))− ψ̃ (F−1v (q) , F−1v (q) , F−1u (q))∣∣∣ dq
and for all q ∈ [δ, 1− δ] , we have a bound via a pointwise Taylor expansion,
T1 ≤






∥∥(F−1N,v (q) , F−1N,v (q) , F−1J,u (q))− (F−1v (q) , F−1v (q) , F−1u (q))∥∥∞ .(24)
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Note that Lemma 10 implies that
∥∥∥∇ψ̃∥∥∥
∞
exists. Combining equations (19) - (24) and the
bound on T2, we have that






∣∣(F−1N,v (q) , F−1N,v (q) , F−1J,u (q))− (F−1v (q) , F−1v (q) , F−1u (q))∣∣+ 8δ ‖ψ‖∞
where 8δ ‖ψ‖∞ is the contribution from equation (21) and the bound on T2.
We now show that |E (ψN |mvN ,muJ)− ψ| → 0 in probability as N → ∞. Fix ε > 0 and





∣∣(F−1N,v (q) , F−1N,v (q) , F−1J,u (q))− (F−1v (q) , F−1v (q) , F−1u (q))∣∣






∣∣(F−1N,v (q) , F−1N,v (q) , F−1J,u (q))− (F−1v (q) , F−1v (q) , F−1u (q))∣∣ > ε2
)
< ε.
This implies P (|E (ψN |mvN ,muJ)− ψ| > ε) < ε, proving the desired convergence in proba-
bility to 0.
Lemma 12 ψN − E (ψN |mvN ,muJ) converges in probability to 0 if ‖Ψ‖∞ <∞.
Proof. Let v(k) and u(k) be k’th order statistics of worker and firm desirability and let X(k)





that the second moment of the function























































where the first equality follows from independence and ‖σ2‖∞ is defined as the supremum of
the function
σ2 (v1, v2, u) = V ar (Ψ (X1, X2, Z) |h (X1; θ0) + ε1 = v1, h (X2; θ0) + ε2 = v2, g (Z; θ0) + η = u) .
The quantity ‖σ2‖∞ is well defined and finite since Ψ (x1, x2, z) is bounded.
However, since ψN − E (ψN |mvN ,muJ) is by definition mean zero, it follows that the un-
conditional variance of ψN − E (ψN |mvN ,muJ) is bounded above by 1J ‖σ
2‖∞ , by the law of
total variance.. This proves
√
N (ψN − E (ψN |mvN ,muJ)) = Op (1) and thus, by Chevyshev’s
inequality, ψN − E (ψN |mvN ,muJ) = op (1) .
Proposition 3 Let ψk and ψkN denote the k-th dimensions of ψ and ψN respectively. If
Assumption 5 is satisfied, then for each k ∈ {1, . . . , KΨ}, ψkN − ψk converges in probability
to 0.
Proof. The proof is identical for each component k. For notational simplicity we drop the
index k. Since ψN − ψ = (ψN − E (ψN |mvN ,muJ)) + (E (ψN |mvN ,muJ)− ψ) is the sum of two
terms that converge in probability to 0, this follows directly from Slutsky’s theorem.
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B.3 Proof of Proposition 4
For ease of notation, define the quantities
ε (q, x; θ) = F−1v;θ (q)− h (x; θ)
εN (q, x; θ) = F
−1
N,u;θ (q)− h (x; θ)
η (q, z; θ) = F−1u;θ (q)− g (z; θ)
ηJ (q, z; θ) = F
−1
J,u;θ (q)− g (z; θ) .
We first prove three preliminary results




















Ψ (X1, X2, Z) fε (εN (q,X1; θ)) fε (εN (q,X2; θ)) fη (ηJ (q, Z; θ)) dm
xdmxdmz
converges in outer probability to 0.















|tN,1 (q;mx,mz, θ)− tN,1 (q;mxN ,mzJ , θ)| dq
= R1 +R2
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Note that R2 is bounded in absolute value by
sup
θ, q∈[δ,1−δ]
|tN,1 (q;mx,mz, θ)− tN,1 (q;mxN ,mzJ , θ)|
= sup
θ, v∈[v1, v2], u∈[u1, u2]
∣∣∣∣∫ Ψ (X1, X2, Z) fε (u− h (X1; θ)) fε (u− h (X2; θ)) fη (v − g (Z; θ))
(dmxdmxdmz − dmxNdmxNdmzJ)|
where [u1, u2] =
[




and [v1, v2] =
[





expression above converges in outer probability to 0 by the Glivenko-Cantelli theorem:
{Ψ (X1, X2, Z) fε (u− h (x; θ)) fε (u− h (x; θ)) fη (v − g (z; θ))}u∈[u1, u2], v∈[v1,v2], θ∈Θ
is a Glivenko-Cantelli class for all u1, u2, v1, v2 since
Ψ (X1, X2, Z) fε (u− h (x; θ)) fε (u− h (x; θ)) fη (v − g (z; θ))
is uniformly Lipschitz in u, v, and θ, and Θ× [u1, u2]× [v1, v2] is compact.









∣∣∣∣∫ Ψ (X1, X2, Z) [fε (ε (q,X1; θ)) fε (ε (q,X2; θ)) fη (η (q, Z; θ))
−fε (εN (q,X1; θ)) fε (εN (q,X2; θ)) fη (ηJ (q, Z; θ))] dmxdmxdmzdq|
≤ ‖Ψ‖∞ sup
θ,qε[δ,1−δ]
|fε (ε (q,X1; θ)) fε (ε (q,X2; θ)) fη (η (q, Z; θ)) −
fε (εN (q,X1; θ)) fε (εN (q,X2; θ)) fη (ηJ (q, Z; θ))| .
We now show that
sup
θ,qε[δ,1−δ]
|fε (ε (q,X1; θ)) fε (ε (q,X2; θ)) fη (η (q, Z; θ))− fε (εN (q,X1; θ)) fε (εN (q,X2; θ)) fη (ηJ (q, Z; θ))|
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converges to 0 in outer probability. First rewrite the difference
fε (ε (q, x1; θ)) fε (ε (q, x2; θ)) fη (η (q, z; θ))− fε (εN (q, x1; θ)) fε (εN (q, x2; θ)) fη (ηJ (q, z; θ))
= fε (ε (q, x1; θ)) fε (ε (q, x2; θ)) [fη (η (q, z; θ))− fη (ηJ (q, z; θ))]
+fη (η (q, z; θ)) [fε (ε (q, x1; θ)) fε (ε (q, x2; θ))− fε (εN (q, x1; θ)) fε (εN (q, x2; θ))]
+ [fη (ηJ (q, z; θ))− fη (η (q, z; θ))] [fε (ε (q, x1; θ)) fε (ε (q, x2; θ))− fε (εN (q, x1; θ)) fε (εN (q, x2; θ))] .
Hence, by the triangle inequality,
|fε (ε (q, x1; θ)) fε (ε (q, x2; θ)) fη (η (q, z; θ))− fε (εN (q, x1; θ)) fε (εN (q, x2; θ)) fη (ηJ (q, z; θ))|
≤ fε (ε (q, x1; θ)) fε (ε (q, x2; θ)) |fη (η (q, z; θ))− fη (ηJ (q, z; θ))|
+ fη (η (q, z; θ)) |fε (ε (q, x1; θ)) fε (ε (q, x2; θ))− fε (εN (q, x1; θ)) fε (εN (q, x2; θ))|
+ |fη (ηJ (q, z; θ))− fη (η (q, z; θ))| |fε (ε (q, x1; θ)) fε (ε (q, x2; θ))− fε (εN (q, x1; θ)) fε (εN (q, x2; θ))|
Further, since fε and fη are bounded,
|fε (ε (q, x1; θ)) fε (ε (q, x2; θ)) fη (η (q, z; θ))− fε (εN (q, x1; θ)) fε (εN (q, x2; θ)) fη (ηN (q, z; θ))|
≤ ‖fε‖2∞ |fη (η (q, z; θ))− fη (ηN (q, z; θ))|
+ ‖fη‖∞ |fε (ε (q, x1; θ)) fε (ε (q, x2; θ))− fε (εN (q, x1; θ)) fε (εN (q, x2; θ))|
+2 ‖fη‖∞ |fε (ε (q, x1; θ)) fε (ε (q, x2; θ))− fε (εN (q, x1; θ)) fε (εN (q, x2; θ))|
≤ ‖fε‖2∞
∥∥f ′η∥∥∞ |η (q, z; θ)− ηN (q, z; θ)|
+3 ‖fη‖∞ ‖fε‖∞ ‖f
′
ε‖∞ |ε (q, x1; θ)− εN (q, x1; θ)|
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where the last inequality follows from a Taylor expansion. Hence, we have that
‖Ψ‖∞ sup
θ,qε[δ,1−δ]
|fε (ε (q, x1; θ)) fε (ε (q, x2; θ)) fη (η (q, z; θ))





|η (q, z; θ)− ηN (q, z; θ)|
+3 ‖Ψ‖∞ ‖fη‖ ‖fε‖∞ ‖f ′ε‖ sup
θ∈Θ
|ε (q, x1; θ)− εN (q, x1; θ)| .
By Lemma 9, supθ∈Θ,q∈[δ,1−δ] |ε (q, x; θ)− εN (q, x; θ)| and supθ∈Θ,q∈[δ,1−δ] |η (q, z; θ)− ηN (q, z; θ)|
converge in outer probability to 0. Hence, |R1| is bounded by a function that converges in
outer probability to 0.
Since T1,δ is bounded above by the sum of elements which converge in outer probability
to 0, it does so as well.






[δ, 1− δ], the quantities
∫
fε (ε (q,X1; θ)) dm
x and
∫
fη (η (q, Z; θ)) dm
z
are bounded away from 0, uniformly in θ. In particular,
∫
fε (ε (q,X1; θ)) fε (ε (q,X2; θ)) fη (η (q, Z; θ)) dm
xdmxdmz
is also bounded away from zero.
Proof. Note that
∫





















are the densities of u and v at their q-th quantiles
respectively. Assumptions 5(ii) and (iii) require that fε and fη are continuous and strictly
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positive, hence they bounded away from zero on any compact set. Consequently, fu;θ and
fv;θ are also bounded away from zero on any compact set. Since F−1u;θ is jointly continuous,
the image F−1u;θ ([δ, 1− δ]) is compact and fv;θ (F−1v (q)) fv;θ (F−1v (q)) fu;θ (F−1u (q)) is bounded
away from 0 for all q ∈ [δ, 1− δ].





∣∣∣∣ 1∫ fε (ε (q,X1; θ)) fε (ε (q,X2; θ)) fη (η (q, Z; θ)) dmxdmxdmz
− 1∫








converges in outer probability to 0.
Proof. As in proof of Lemma 13,
LN = sup
θ,q∈[δ,1−δ]
∣∣∣∣∫ fε (ε (q,X1; θ)) fε (ε (q,X2; θ)) fη (η (q, Z; θ)) dmxdmxdmz −∫
fε (εN (q,X1; θ)) fε (εN (q,X2; θ)) fη (ηN (q, Z; θ))
∣∣∣∣ dmxNdmxNdmzJ
converges in outer probability to 0. Since
∫
fε (ε (q,X1; θ)) fε (ε (q,X2; θ)) fη (η (q, Z; θ)) dm
xdmxdmz
is bounded away from 0 over q ∈ [δ, 1− δ] and all θ (Lemma 14), a tailor expansion of the




∣∣∣∣ 1∫ fε (ε (q,X1; θ)) fε (ε (q,X2; θ)) fη (η (q, Z; θ)) dmxdmxdmz−
1∫








Therefore, T2,δ converges in outer probability to 0.









J) respectively. If Assumptions 5(i) - (iii) are satisfied, then for each k ∈
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{1, . . . , KΨ},
∣∣ψk (θ)− ψkN (θ;mxN ,mzJ)∣∣ converges in outer probability to 0 uniformly in θ.





tional simplicity, we drop the index for the dimension k.
Rewrite
ψ (θ)− ψN (θ;mxN ,mzN) =
∫ 1
0








Ψ (X1, X2, Z) fε (ε (q,X1; θ)) fε (ε (q,X2; θ)) fη (η (q, Z; θ)) dm
xdmxdmz∫
fε (ε (q,X1; θ)) fε (ε (q,X2; θ)) fη (η (q, Z; θ)) dmxdmxdmz
−
∫




















, we have that
ψ (θ)− ψN (θ;mxN ,mzN) =
∫ 1−δ
δ









t (q, θ;mxN ,m
z
N) dq















Ψ (X1, X2, Z) fε (ε (q,X1; θ)) fε (ε (q,X2; θ)) fη (η (q, Z; θ)) dm
xdmxdmz∫

















































Hence, by the triangle inequality,


















t (q, θ;mxN ,m
z
N) dq
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 4δ ‖M‖∞ . (27)








∣∣∣∣∫ Ψ (X1, X2, Z) fε (ε (q,X1; θ)) fε (ε (q,X2; θ)) fη (η (q, Z; θ)) dmxdmxdmz
−
∫









fε (ε (q,X1; θ)) fε (ε (q,X2; θ)) fη (η (q, Z; θ)) dmxdmxdmz
T1,δ (28)




∣∣∣∣ 1∫ fε (ε (q,X1; θ)) fε (ε (q,X2; θ)) fη (η (q, Z; θ)) dmxdmxdmz
− 1∫








= ‖Ψ‖∞ T2,δ (29)
For any ε, δ can be chosen to make 4δ ‖Ψ‖∞ ≤ ε without reference to θ. Hence, we need
to show that the terms |R1| and |R2| can also be made small enough, uniformly in θ. By
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equations (26), (27), (28) and (29),
sup
θ∈Θ






fε (ε (q,X1; θ)) fε (ε (q,X2; θ)) fη (η (q, Z; θ)) dmxdmxdmz
)
T1,δ
+ ‖Ψ‖∞ T2,δ + 4δ ‖Ψ‖∞ ,





fε (ε (q,X1; θ)) fε (ε (q,X2; θ)) fη (η (q, Z; θ)) dmxdmxdmz
is bounded since
∫
fε (ε (q,X1; θ)) fε (ε (q,X2; θ)) fη (η (q, Z; θ)) dm
xdmxdmz is bounded away
from 0 (Lemma 14).
Fix ε > 0, and pick δ = ε
8‖Ψ‖∞
. For sample size N suffi ciently large, we have that
P
T1,δ > ( sup
θ,q∈[δ,1−δ]
4∫















|ψ (θ)− ψN (θ;mxN ,mzJ)| > ε
)
< ε
proving the desired uniform convergence in probability.
B.4 Proof of Theorem 4
Fix ε > 0, and choose δ such that ‖ψ (θ)− ψ (θ0)‖W < δ2 ⇒ ‖θ − θ0‖ < ε.
By Propositions 3 and 4 and the continuous mapping theorem, ‖ψN − ψN (θ)‖W converges
in (outer) probability to ‖ψ − ψ (θ)‖W uniformly in θ.
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so with probability at least 1− ε,
inf
θ∈Θ




‖ψ − ψ (θ)‖W +
δ




and ∥∥∥ψ − ψ (θ̂N)∥∥∥
W
≤






Hence, ∥∥∥ψ − ψ (θ̂N)∥∥∥
W
≤ δ
However, by Assumption 6, this implies
∥∥∥θ̂N − θ0∥∥∥ < ε. It follows that θ̂N converges in
probability to θ0, proving consistency of the estimator.
C Parametric Boostrap
Let {zj}Jj=1 be a sample of firm characteristics and {xi}
N
i=1 denote a sample of worker char-
acteristics. The parametric bootstrap for the estimate θ̂ = arg minθ∈Θ Q̂N (θ) is constructed
by the following procedure for b = {1, . . . , 500}







2. Draw N b workers with replacement from the empirical sample {xi}Ni=1, where N b =∑
cbj and c
b
j is capacity of the j-th sampled firm in the bootstrap sample.




4. Compute the quantities vbi and u
b
j at θ̂ from equations (14a) and (14b). For the model
with preference heterogeneity, compute ubij as in equation (15b).
5. Compute a pairwise stable match for the bootstrap sample.
6. Compute θ̂b = arg minθ∈Θ Q̂bN (θ) using the bootstrap pairwise stable match and an
independent set of simulations for Q̂bN (θ).
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